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Income diversification by individuals and households is
ubiquitous in the rural economies of developing countries
(Barrett, Reardon, & Webb, 2001; Ellis, 2000; Martin &
Lorenzen, 2016). Why? If markets were complete and costless,
income diversification can be interpreted as the opposite of
specialization: failure to deepen investment in specific enter-
prises and thus benefit from economies of scale (Ellis, 2000).
With restricted and costly exchange, however, income diversi-
fication can be interpreted as the net result of trading off
advantages of specialization in specific enterprises with com-
plementarities and economies of scope between enterprises.
For example, with thinly-traded labor markets, diversification
can be a rational response to seasonality of labor requirements
in agricultural enterprises that entail periods of labor surplus
and shortage (Ellis, 2000). Or with incomplete credit or insur-
ance markets, diversification can be an appropriate ex ante or
ex post approach for managing weather or price risks (Barrett
et al., 2001; Ellis, 2000). Income diversification can involve dif-
ferent forms of production agriculture (e.g. cereals, perennials,
livestock, horticulture), participation in both production and
value addition (e.g. sales, processing), or engagement in both
on-farm and off-farm employment (e.g. casual labor, formal
sector employment).
Income diversification is thus one of the few strategies avail-
able to farm families living in situations of constrained mar-
kets, a situation that is prevalent in developing country
economies (Stiglitz, 1989). The proximate determinants of
diversification vary from case to case, although the literature
shows empirical regularities (Barrett et al., 2001; De Janvry
& Sadoulet, 2001; Himanshu, Lanjouw, Murgai, & Stern,
2013). For a household on an upward trajectory from poverty
to increased prosperity, households diversify income sources
in order to absorb seasonal labor shortages, exploit economies
of scope between enterprises, or leverage limited financial cap-
ital. For a household on a downward trajectory toward wors-
ening poverty, diversification can be a constrained response to
expected future income shocks. The motives associated with375these upward and downward trends are alternatively described
as ‘‘opportunity-led or survival-led” (Alobo Loison, 2015),
‘‘necessity or choice” (Ellis, 2000), ‘‘pull or push” (Barrett
et al., 2001), ‘‘progressive success or distress” (Martin &
Lorenzen, 2016), or ‘‘asset-based or insurance-based”
(Anderson & Deshingkar, 2005). In many circumstances,
households may respond to both types of motivations, espe-
cially where a single event, such as a prolonged illness of a
breadwinner, can make the difference between moving into
or out of poverty (Krishna, 2010).
Regardless of the motives in specific contexts, however, the
evidence indicates that most poor rural households benefit
from opportunities to diversify farm and non-farm income
sources. From a review of evidence from 11 Latin American
countries, Reardon, Berdegue, and Escobar (2001) found
diversification of rural incomes to be highest in countries with
lowest average income, but, controlling for country and
region, highest among households with highest average
incomes. Barrett et al. (2001) review results from Ethiopia,
Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya that show income diver-
sification to be positively associated with household welfare
measures. Using data from a nationally representative survey
of India, Birthal, Roy, and Negi (2015) find that smallholder
households that diversify toward high-value crops have higher
per capita household expenditures than household that diver-accepted: February 8, 2017.
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such studies: do households diversity more because they have
higher income or do they have higher income because they
diversify more?
Several household characteristics have been commonly
found to influence the extent of income diversification. This
includes: (1) positive or negative association with the age of
the household head (Agyeman, Asuming-Brempong, &
Onumah, 2014; Khatun & Roy, 2012); (2) positive association
with amount or value of assets (Agyeman et al., 2014; Ellis,
2000; Khatun & Roy, 2012); (3) positive association with
diversity of assets (Martin & Lorenzen, 2016), (4) positive
association with availability of household labor (Agyeman
et al., 2014; Ellis, 2000; Liu & Lan, 2015), (5) positive associ-
ation with level of education (Agyeman et al., 2014; Barrett
et al., 2001; Khatun & Roy, 2012; Liu & Lan, 2015), and (6)
positive association with the prevalence of market or produc-
tion risks (Alobo Loison, 2015).
Physical context can affect opportunities for diversification.
For example, households located near urban centers, mines, or
plantations tend to have greater opportunities to earn income
in those sectors, while households located near towns, highways,
or market centers may have greater opportunities to market raw
or processed food (e.g., Agyeman et al., 2014; Joshi, Gulati,
Birthal, & Tewari, 2004). Households located in remote forested
areas are more likely to rely on the consumption and sale of
products gathered from the forest than households located fur-
ther away (e.g., Belcher, Achdiawan, & Dewi, 2015).
Social context may be an equally important determinant of
diversification. In India, for example, caste and ethnicity pro-
vide the basis for multi-functional social networks. Rural fam-
ilies use caste-based networks to find marriage partners for
girls in other rural areas, for men to identify opportunities
for temporary migration, and for families to reduce income
risk through gifts and loans (Munshi & Rosenweig, 2016).
These gifts and loans function as substitutes for formal insur-
ance and state-sponsored safety nets. Munshi and Rosenweig
(2016) propose that rural insurance networks underlie the per-
sistence of large wage gaps between urban and rural India.
In this paper we evaluate the role of intra-village social net-
works in enabling household income diversification in rural
India. Understanding intra-village social networks and their
effects can help with the design of rural service programs
and the assessment of such interventions. Social network anal-
ysis shows who will be included or excluded if advisory ser-
vices are supplied through focal point, interest group, or
affirmative action approaches that target social marginalized
groups (Glendenning, Babu, & Asenso-Okyere, 2010). The
magnitude of the network effect on diversification also has
implications for resource allocation—a larger effect of network
on diversification implies that a larger share of resources
should be devoted to strengthening those networks. Network
approaches can also be used to measure ripple effects as the
outcome of a policy intervention spreads through socially con-
nected individuals (a social multiplier effect). While previous
studies have examined the role of social networks on economic
outcomes such as agricultural technology adoption (Maertens
& Barrett, 2013; Matuschke & Qaim, 2009), risk sharing
(Fafchamps & Lund, 2003; Munshi & Rosenweig, 2016), labor
markets (Calvo-Armengol & Jackson, 2004), and diffusion of
micro-finance (Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, & Jackson,
2013), only a few previous studies have explored connections
between social networks and diversification. No other study
has applied the same network analysis and econometric meth-
ods to the study of the effects of social networks on diversifi-
cation.Cinner and Bodin (2010) use a network analysis approach to
map occupations and the connections between those occupa-
tions in 27 coastal communities in 5 western Indian Ocean
countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Seychelles, and
Mauritius). They relate the position of each occupation (e.g.
measures of centrality) in the ‘‘livelihood landscape” to indica-
tors of socio-economic development and network statistics
(e.g. density) to community-level development and population
density. Their findings suggest a positive association between
specialization and development at the household level, but
no particular association at the community level. Baird and
Gray (2014) consider income diversification and social net-
works of exchange as alternative mechanisms that pastoral
households use to manage risk and uncertainty in Northern
Tanzania, finding that income diversification and inter-
household exchange serve as substitutes.
The context for the current study is a small contiguous
region within the Western Ghats region of the Indian state
of Kerala. The population of the area is comprised of a mix-
ture of ethnic groups and castes, and households engage in a
range of livelihood activities. We represent intra-village
household-to-household networks through an adjacency
matrix derived from household interview data we collected
on several dimensions of social contact. These data also allow
us to construct standard measures of network centrality of
households, as well as village-level measures of social stratifi-
cation based on social contacts within and between castes
and tribes. The data also allow us to use methods adapted
from spatial econometrics to estimate network multipliers,
i.e. the multiplicative effects of social networks on the determi-
nants of income diversification. To avoid mischaracterization
of network statistics, we conducted interviews with all house-
holds in each of nine villages, which allowed us to examine
complete networks. This is important as sample-based statis-
tics may misrepresent their population counterparts
(Costenbader & Valente, 2003; Lee, Kim, & Jeong, 2006).
While Baird and Gray (2014) focus on exchange networks per
se, we took an inclusive approach to social networks very similar
to the approach that Banerjee et al. (2013) took in their study of
the effects of social networks on the diffusion of micro-finance in
Karnataka, India. This approach is most consistent with a concept
of social network as a vehicle for exchanging resources and infor-
mation. We conclude that intra-village social networks play very
important roles in enabling diversification in our study context.
Our results indicate the existence of: (i) a social multiplier effect
with respect to income diversification, i.e., network diversification
is positively associated with own diversification; (ii) a social posi-
tion effect on diversification, i.e., household centrality is positively
associated with income diversification; and (iii) social stratifica-
tion, i.e., social connections reveal assortative mixing (connections
within caste are more prominent than between caste).
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
description of the study site and sampling, while Section 3 pro-
vides a description of the data and the methods used to model
social networks, income diversification, and their inter-
relationship. Section 4 provides results and Section 5 offers a
discussion and conclusion.2. STUDY SITE AND DATA
(a) Study location
We conducted this study in nine villages of Meenangadi
Panchayat (decentralized territorial unit) in Wayanad District
of Kerala, southern India. The primary sources of income in
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pepper, and rubber. Rice, banana, tubers, and fruits are the
most common food crops. In recent years, there has been an
increase in non-farm activities and during fieldwork we
observed that people were involved with a variety of non-
farm activities including non-agricultural labor, government
service, shop keeping, small-scale retail ventures, transporta-
tion services (operation of rickshaws, trucks, and tractors),
as well as employment offered by the Mahamta Ghandi
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (Ravi &
Engler, 2015).
The area has remarkably high ethnic heterogeneity. As
noted by Munshi and Rosenweig (2016), Indian society is
highly stratified by the caste system. Mohindra, Haddad,
and Narayana (2006, p. 1010) describe caste as a ‘‘hereditary,
endogamous, usually localized group, having a traditional
association with an occupation and a particular position in
the hierarchy of castes”. The castes are categorized into four
main groups namely Scheduled Tribes (ST), Scheduled Castes
(SC), Other Backward Classes (OBC), and General caste
(General). The Scheduled Tribes are indigenous people of
India, also known as Adivasis, who continue to face system-
atic discrimination in Indian society. One of the most distinc-
tive features of Wayanad District is the magnitude and
diversity of the tribal population. There are about 35 tribal
communities in Kerala and Wayanad District has the highest
concentration of tribal populations in Kerala (Census of
India, 2011). The five main Scheduled Tribes in the study area
are Kurichya, Kuruma, Paniya, Adiya, and Kattunaika. On
the basis of systematic differences in health, education, and
employment status, Rajasenan, Abraham, and Rajeev (2013)
distinguish the Kurichya and Kuruma as ‘‘forward tribes”
(relatively high levels of socio-economic development) and
the Paniya, Adiya, and Kattunaika as ‘‘backward tribes” (rel-
atively low levels of socio-economic development).
In the past, tribal communities did not have permanent
houses and tended to live in remote forests. However, eco-
nomic change and targeted programs by federal and state gov-
ernments have enabled most tribal communities to build
permanent houses and own small parcels of land. In Wayanad,
most tribal communities settle in groups or clusters with
houses located close together. These clusters are commonly
referred to as tribal settlements or colonies. A typical village
has one or more tribal settlement. Extended families tend to
live in the same settlement.(b) Sampling and data collection
Data required for this study was collected from a census of
all 301 households residing in nine villages in Meenangadi
Panchayat. The unit of analysis is a household. Respondents
were selected from a census of approximately 1000 households
living in 31 villages that were previously included in a related
study, ‘‘Alleviating Poverty and Malnutrition in Agrobiodi-
versity Hotspots.” The 31 villages are located within a contigu-
ous area of Meenangadi Panchayat selected to test the efficacy
of a number of agricultural technologies and enterprises for
improving household nutrition and income (Ragu et al.,
2013). The villages are located relatively near to each other,
in an area of rolling hills and forest remnants in the Western
Ghats region of southwest India. Out of the 31 villages, all
small villages (<20 households) and large villages (>100 house-
holds) were excluded from consideration. Nine intermediate-
sized villages (between 20 and 100 households) were thus
selected. This focus on intermediate-sized villages reduced sur-
vey costs, helped ensure a reasonable sample of villages, andallowed us to depict the complete picture of social networks
within each village. A sampling design that surveys all house-
holds in the village is important because network measures
(e.g., centrality) based on a portion of the network may distort
complex relationships of the true (or complete) network struc-
ture (Costenbader & Valente, 2003; Lee et al., 2006). As a
result, to avoid measurement error bias, all households in each
of the nine villages were included in the household survey.
Some of our data were obtained from a cross-sectional sur-
vey implemented in 2013 by the M.S. Swaminathan Research
Foundation (India) and the University of Alberta (Canada) as
part of a larger research project (Ragu et al., 2013). In order to
capture income diversification, household incomes were cate-
gorized into different sources, identified through a pilot survey,
namely: sales of surplus staple crops, sales of fruits and vegeta-
bles, sales of crop by-products, sales of livestock products,
oxen rental, agricultural wages, income from off-farm activi-
ties, migration income, and salaried employment. Annual
income in rupees earned from each of these sources was
obtained from recall questions posed to the household respon-
dents. That survey also collected information on household
demographics such as age, household size, education of the
household head, religion, and ethnic background. The survey
also collected information on household assets and infrastruc-
ture as well as incidences of household shocks like loss of
crops and assets.
To measure the social networks of each household, a ques-
tionnaire was drafted based on the social network survey devel-
oped by Banerjee et al. (2013) for their study of diffusion of
microfinance in villages of rural Karnataka, India. The site of
the Banerjee et al. (2013) study is less than 200 km from our
Meenangadi field site.We adapted the Banerjee et al. (2013) sur-
vey design to capture within-village inter-household social
interactions. Our social network survey included questions on
thirteen possible dimensions of interactions through which
householdswithin a village could be connected. Local field tech-
nicians who implemented the earlier baseline survey were also
involved in implementing the social network survey between
November 2013 and January 2014. Specifically, the survey col-
lected from each household answers to the following questions:
1. Which members of your family do you maintain good
relations with?
2. Who comes to your house to watch television?
3. Who would you ask for help if you had a medical
emergency?
4. If you needed to borrow Kerosene, rice, wheat, sugar or
some other necessary good, whom would you go to?
5. With whom would you go to visit places of worship?
6. If you suddenly needed to borrow Rs. 100 for a day,
whom would you ask for money?
7. If you had to make a difficult personal decision, whom
would you ask for advice?
8. Who do you go to for advice?
9. Who are the people that you consider to be influential
and respected by everyone?
10. With whom do you share foods produced in your home
garden?
11. To whom do you sell agricultural food products?
12. To whom do you sell other products?
13. Whom do you ask for information about government
programs/policies?
The survey was administered in the main local language
(Malayalam) to a member of the household older than
18 years of age. Enumerators translated the questionnaire into
other local languages for respondents not comfortable speak-
378 WORLD DEVELOPMENTing Malayalam (eg. Paniya, Adiya, Kattunayakan, Kurichiya,
Kuruma). In most cases (91% of the observations) the head of
the household answered the questions and in some cases the
spouse of the head answered, or both answered jointly. For
each question, respondents were asked to list residents of mul-
tiple households if appropriate. The responses were used to
construct household-level networks. For example, if the
respondent of household 1 declared that in case of a medical
emergency he/she would ask for help from residents of house-
holds 2 and 4; then we interpret that household 1 is connected
to both 2 and 4 in a network for medical emergency support.
We investigate the possibility of gender differences in our
network elicitation instrument as men and women may have
very different responses to the questions above. We statisti-
cally test for differences in mean network centralities (an
important network characteristic, see 3(d)) between male-
and female-headed households. The t-test results indicate that
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of mean cen-
trality between male- and female-headed households. This
suggests that gender is not influencing network structure in
our sample.3. METHODS
(a) Measuring income diversification
Most empirical studies in the literature measure income
diversification as an index such as the Simpson, Herfindahl,
or Shannon. These indices account for both the number of
income sources and the balance among them (Ersado, 2006;
Joshi et al., 2004; Minot, Epprecht, Tran, Tram, & Le
Quang, 2006). In this paper we use the Simpson Index of





where i is a particular household, s is a particular income
source, and P i;s is the proportion of household i’s income from
source s out of k possible sources. The value of the Simpson
index falls between zero and 1  1/k (Minot et al., 2006),
which equals 0 if there is just one source of income (k = 1,
Pi,k = 1), indicating no diversification. As the number of
income sources increases, the shares Ps decline and so does
the sum of the squared shares. As a result, Simpson approaches
an upper limit of 1  1/k. Thus a higher Simpson index
implies greater diversification.
(b) Determinants of social networks
As discussed in the introduction, we draw a distinction
between household characteristics and contextual factors as
determinants of diversification. We thus collected data on
variables that have been found to be important determinants
of both push and pull diversification in previous studies,
specifically different types of assets, exposure to risks, and
social structure.
(c) Representing social networks
In general a social network is a set of nodes joined by some
relation (e.g., households connected for medical emergency
support). Nodes can be persons, groups, organizations, or
entities such as texts, artifacts, and even concepts (Butts,
2008). This study represents each of the 9 villages as a networkof households linked through social ties. The medium-sized
villages (20–100 households) included in this study are small
enough for all households to know each other but large
enough to capture many forms of social interactions. Thus a
household’s social network consists of all households within
their home village that it interacts with one or more of the
13 dimensions.
In empirical contexts, network data are often represented by
an adjacency square matrix whose ijth cell is equal to 1 if node
i has a link to node j, and 0 otherwise (Butts, 2008; Jackson,
2008). By convention, the diagonal of the matrix is 0 indicat-
ing that a node is not connected to itself. Below is an example









In the example, node 1 is connected with 2, node 2 is con-
nected with both 1 and 3, and node 3 is connected with 2.





We used the answers to the social network questions to con-
struct an adjacent matrix representing the social network for
each of the nine villages in our study. We constructed undi-
rected networks, i.e. an i–j connection implies a j–i connection
such that the adjacent matrix is symmetric. Therefore, a link
between households i and j exists if: (i) household i mentions
a member in household j as a contact in response to one or
more of the network questions; and/or (ii) a member of house-
hold j mentions a member in household i as a contact. For
example, household i may report borrowing money or mate-
rial goods from j although j did not borrow from i. We assume
that the one-way borrowing link is sufficient to create a link
between the two households through which information, ser-
vices, or skills could flow in either direction.
The network data collected enabled us to construct 13
matrices that take account of the connections between house-
holds along each of the 13 dimensions included in the ques-
tionnaire. For this paper, we constructed a representative
social network matrix where two households are considered
to be linked if they have a relationship in any of the thirteen
dimensions. The representative social network is thus the
union of the 13 matrices. This approach offers several advan-
tages to our study of income diversification. First, as discussed
by Banerjee et al. (2013), this is an appropriate network mea-
sure since the emphasis here is on the links between two house-
holds and any of the dimensions included in the survey creates
an opportunity for interaction and information exchange. Sec-
ond, collapsing the 13 different dimensions of social interac-
tion in a single unweighted network avoids giving (possibly
ad hoc) weights to different connections as it is difficult (if
not impossible) to predict the relevance of each dimension
for income diversification. Third, the union of all networks
avoids the occurrence of isolated households, which would
lead to difficulties in the identification of the econometric
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eigenvector centrality of isolated nodes.
In this paper we use this social network data to estimate an
econometric model that captures average network effects on
diversification. In other words, we are interested in estimating
how the diversification of a household’s social network affects
the household’s own diversification. A discussion of this
approach is presented in Section 3(e) and (i).
We also use the social network data to examine caste-based
social stratification. Specifically, our data allow us to measure
network homophily, i.e. the propensity of social contact
between similar people to occur at a higher rate than among
dissimilar people. The assortativity coefficient developed by
Newman (2003) is typically used to quantify the level of homo-
phily in a network. Formally, Newman’s assortativity coeffi-







where eij is the share of links between nodes of type i and j,
ai ¼
P
jeij, and bj ¼
P
ieij. We construct the coefficient to con-
sider assortative mixing in networks according to the caste or
ethnicity of each household. In general, 1 < r < 1. Positive
values of r indicate assortative mixing (or homophily) while
negative values indicate disassortative mixing. A value of zero
reflects neutrally mixed networks.
(d) Measuring social network centrality
This paper uses indices of social network centrality as a sec-
ond method to characterize social interactions between house-
holds within a village. Centrality indices measure the influence
or position of nodes within in a network. We use centrality
measures to examine whether social position of a household
influences their diversification profile.
Two commonly used centrality measures are degree central-
ity and eigenvector centrality. Degree centrality indicates how
well a node is connected in terms of direct connections with
other nodes (Butts, 2008). In the case of an undirected net-
work, the degree of a node is the number of direct connections
the node has with other nodes (Jackson, 2008). Degree central-
ity is the proportion of connections of a node, i.e. the degree
divided by (n-1), where n is the number of nodes in the net-
work (hence, n-1 is the maximum number of connections a
node may have). Formally, degree centrality is measured as:
Cdði;AÞ ¼ NðiÞ=ðn 1Þ
where, Cdði;WÞ represents the degree centrality Cd of node i in
networkW, N is the number of connections attached to node i,
and n is the number of nodes in the network. As degree cen-
trality is the proportion of connections of a particular node,
it ranges from 0 to 1 and is one of the simplest measures of
the social position (or influence) of that node. For example,
in a network of size 10 (10 nodes), a node with a degree of 9
is directly connected to all other nodes and thus is very central
to the network (Butts, 2008). A node with high degree central-
ity is expected to have larger influence on those around it and
possibly the entire network.
While degree captures centrality by examining the number
of connections of a node (a quantity measure), eigenvector
centrality is based on the idea that a node’s importance is
determined by the importance of the nodes it connects with.
This measure qualifies each connection by taking into account
a node’s proximity to other important nodes (Jackson, 2008).
Let Ceði;WÞ denote the eigenvector centrality of node i in net-work W. The centrality of node i is proportional to the sum of






where wij is the ijth element of the adjacent network matrix W,
and k is a scalar.
In matrix notation, eigenvector centrality can be represented
as kCe = WCe, where Ce is a vector that collects the eigenvec-
tor centrality of all nodes in W. Note that Ce is an eigenvector
of the matrix W, and k is its corresponding eigenvalue
(Jackson, 2008). 1 Our eigenvector measure also ranges from
0 to 1. As with degree centrality, a higher value of eigenvector
centrality indicates a higher importance or centrality. In sum-
mary, the two centrality measures capture different dimensions
of node importance (Borgatti, 2005).
(e) Empirical models
In this paper we use two econometric models to examine the
influence of social networks on income diversification. The
first model estimates the effect of household i’s social network
on i’s own income diversification. The second model estimates
the effect of household i’s network centrality on their income
diversification. Other possible determinants of diversification
are included as control variables.
(i) Average network effect model
To build an econometric model we first construct a matrix A
that is a row normalization of the adjacent matrix W that rep-
resents the network. Formally, the elements of A are
aij ¼ wij=
P
jwij, where wij are elements of W. Therefore, aij
can be interpreted as the fraction of network weight that
household i attributes to j. In spatial econometrics, A is often
referred to as the spatial or weighing matrix.
It is useful to present our first empirical model in matrix
notation:
Y ¼ b0 þ b1AYþ b2Xþ e ð1Þ
where Y is a vector of income diversification (measured by the
Simpson index), A is the row normalized social network
matrix, X is a matrix of other determinants of diversification
(e.g. demographics, shocks and assets), e is an independently
and identically distributed (iid) mean zero error term
(EðejXÞ ¼ 0), and bs are parameters to be estimated.
Notice that the vector AY captures the average diversifica-
tion of a household’s social network. The ith row of AY is
equal to the average of the Simpson indices of all households
connected to household i. Including AY in an econometric
model of income diversification allows us to examine how a
household’s diversification is influenced by the average diver-
sification of its network. Therefore, the estimated coefficient
b1 captures the average network effect on diversification.
The matrix X contains data on other determinants of
income diversification that have been widely studied in the lit-
erature, including variables representing household character-
istics, access to infrastructure, assets, risk exposure, and social
structure as described in the introduction. Household charac-
teristics include age of the household head, gender of the
household head, education level the household head, caste
or social category of the household, and number of adult
members in household. Access to infrastructure is represented
by use of electricity and use of cooking gas. Household assets
include land, cattle, and hoes owned by the household. House-
380 WORLD DEVELOPMENThold risk exposure is captured through dummy variables that
indicate whether or not the household experienced a loss of
assets or a crop failure within one year prior to the interview.
Our first empirical model is related to the Spatial Autore-
gressive model, with the spatial matrix replaced by a network
matrix. Conceptually, our model is consistent with Manski’s
theory of social interactions which suggests that the outcome
of each individual depends on her own characteristics and
the mean outcome of her reference group (Manski, 1993).
Bramoulle, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009) applies this theory
to develop an econometric model for identifying peer effects
through social networks. The model used in this study closely
follows Bramoulle et al. (2009).
Our goal is to test whether or not a household’s diversifica-
tion behavior is influenced by the average diversification of its
network (i.e. b1 – 0Þ and how (i.e. is b1 large or small, positive
or negative?). The presence of a negative social network effect
(i.e. b1 < 0) suggests a competitive environment in which the
strategies adopted by household i’s network to increase diver-
sification lead to a decrease in i’s own diversification. The pres-
ence of a positive network effect (i.e. b1 > 0) suggests a social
multiplier where aggregate effects amplify individual effects
(Glaeser, Sacerdote, & Scheinkman, 2003). This amplification
is known as a social multiplier effect. Glaeser et al. (2003) has
explained this using an example of criminal behavior. Crime
deterrence is expected to be affected by changes in policing
or punishment. However, if one person’s inclination toward
crime influences his neighbor’s criminal behavior, then a
change in policing will have both a direct effect on crime
and an indirect effect through social influence. This presence
of positive spillovers or strategic complementarities creates a
‘‘social multiplier” where aggregate coefficients will be greater
than individual coefficients (Glaeser et al., 2003).
Mathematically, this multiplier effect can be demonstrated
through the reduced form representation of the structural
model (1):
Y ¼ ðI b1AÞ1ðb0 þ b2Xþ eÞ ð2Þ
where I is the identity matrix. Notice that b2 captures the
direct effect of X on Y. The term ðI b1AÞ1 represents the
social multiplier as it multiplies the effect of b2. The average
social multiplier g is normally approximated as
g  1=ð1 b1Þ and is interpreted as how much on average net-
work interactions intensify the effect of variation in X on the
outcome Y (Wichmann, 2014). In our application, g captures
the ripple effect of variation in demographics, assets, and
shocks on income diversification. For example, providing agri-
cultural training opportunities and initial support may lead to
a lower incidence of crop shocks and would ultimately affect
income diversification. Such a training program could have a
ripple effect through the village network (due, for instance,
to information transmission) so that the behavior of a single
household may modify the information available to the rest
of the agents in its network (Maurin & Moschion, 2009).
Estimation of the parameters of model (3) can be challeng-
ing because of endogeneity due to reverse causality. This is evi-
dent when the model is written in matrix notation as it
highlights the fact that Y is on both sides of the structural
equation. Manski (1993, 2000) refers to this issue as the reflec-
tion problem. In our paper, it arises from the fact that house-
hold i’s diversification affects its network diversification which,
in turn, affects i’s own diversification. Hence, the variable that
captures the average diversification of the social network (AY)
is an endogenous variable. As a result, ordinary least squares(OLS) estimation of equation (2) provides biased and inconsis-
tent estimators of bs.
We follow the spatial econometrics literature to implement
an instrumental variable strategy and consistently estimate
the parameters of model (3). This literature shows how instru-
mental variables can be constructed using network transfor-
mations of the variables in X (Bramoulle et al., 2009;
Kelejian & Prucha, 1998; Lee, 2003). This literature demon-
strates that pre-multiplying X with A, A2, and A3 leads to vari-
ables that have intuitive interpretations and are valid
instruments for AY. The variable AX represents the average
diversification determinants of a household’s network. The
variable A2X2 captures the average determinants of the net-
work of a household’s network. The corresponding third-
degree relationship is therefore captured by A3X. This instru-
mental variable strategy delivers consistent parameter esti-
mates under the assumption of strict exogeneity of the
regressors X, ðEðejX Þ ¼ 0Þ, and can be easily implemented
using the generalized method of moments or GMM/IV
approach (Bramoulle et al., 2009; Kelejian & Prucha, 1998;
Lee, 2003). Moreover, as Bramoulle et al. (2009) discuss, this
approach is robust when networks have a fixed or exogenous
structure. As a result, an underlying assumption of our estima-
tor is that income diversification does not play a significant
role in forming our matrix A. Note that our approach to con-
struct the social network A captures 13 different dimensions of
social interaction, each very different from the others. For
example, the construction of A considers kinship ties, medical
emergency contacts, sources of general advice, and networks
of recreational social contacts like watching television. This
social heterogeneity allows us to apply the GMM/IV strategy
with a reasonable degree of confidence.
(ii) Network centrality model
We estimate a second empirical model to test whether or not
network centrality influences income diversification. This
approach modifies model (1) by replacing the average behav-
ior of the network AY with a centrality measure C. Equation
4 below represents this model using matrix notation:
Y ¼ a0 þ a1Cþ a2Xþ e ð3Þ
where C is a vector of centrality measures and a s are the
parameters to be estimated. We estimate two specifications,
one in which C captures degree centrality and another in
which C captures eigenvector centrality.
The parameter of interest is a1, the effect of network cen-
trality on income diversification. The centrality indices allow
us to identify households in positions of prominence, e.g.
households whose positions enable actions such as informa-
tion dissemination. Further, examining the effect of central-
ity of households on income diversification can guide the
design and implementation of initiatives that are developed
to facilitate diversification in rural areas. For example, if
household centrality positively affects diversification
ða1 > 0Þ, then policy instruments (such as providing infor-
mation regarding new diversification opportunities, offering
support and training that might assist people in starting
and maintaining new income-generating activities) should
target central actors within a network. This approach can
enhance the effectiveness of new initiatives. For example,
Banerjee et al. (2013) show that participation in microfi-
nance is significantly higher when the injection points, i.e.
households who first adopted the microfinance program,
have higher eigenvector centrality.
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(a) Income diversification
Table 1 provides a description of the various income
sources, amount of income obtained from each source, and
share of total income from each source. Households in our
sample have an average income of 156,512 Rupees per year. 2
The results show significant variation within and between
income sources. Average income per source ranges from 33
Rupees for income from plowing services to 71,842 Rupees
for income from off-farm activities. For all income sources,
we find that the standard deviation is greater than the average,
indicating significant within source heterogeneity. Table 1 also
shows, for each income source, the average and standard devi-
ation of shares across households. 3 On average, 53% of house-
hold income came from off-farm activities.
We further explore heterogeneity in income sources by dis-
tinguishing households into two categories: those that do
not diversify income sources (i.e., all household income comes
from one source) and those that do diversify. Summary statis-
tics based on this distinction are presented in Table 2. 20% of
households do not diversify income sources. On average,
households that diversify earn 34,749 Rupees (27%) more
income than those that don’t diversify. This difference is statis-
tically significant at the 5% level.
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the Simpson index.
The average across all households is 0.274. In our study, there
are 11 possible income sources and thus a household with
equal amounts of income from each source would have a
Simpson index of 1 1=11 ¼ 0:909. As discussed above, 50
households do not diversify and as a result have a Simpson
index of zero. The maximum value of the Simpson Index in
our sample was 0.719, 21% less than the theoretical maximum.
(b) Social networks
Figures 2–10 (in the Appendix A) provide visual depictions
of the social networks in each of the 9 villages. The figures rep-
resent the social network adjacent matrix W discussed in 3(b).
The figures are constructed using the library igraph in R with
the Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) layout. 4 The network
figures are color coded to represent different attributes of theTable 1. Annual income from the different ea
Sources of income
Sale of market surplus staple crops
Sale of surplus fruits and vegetables
Sale of crop by-products
Sale of livestock, birds
Sale of livestock products
Income from services by livestock
Income from agricultural wages
Income from off-farm activities (business, trade, non-ag wages)
Income from migration
Salaried employment
Income from other activities
Total income 1
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the APM Monitoring and Evaluation S
each income source, Table 1 reports the average share across households. F
procedure allow us to calculate standard deviations for each share: Std: Dev:ðsÞ
obtained by dividing the average income of source s by the total income of 15households which is either the caste or tribal affiliation. For
each network W a row normalized matrix A was constructed
to allow for estimation of model (1).
In general, the figures reveal network homophily, i.e. a ten-
dency for nodes (households) with similar characteristics (in
our case caste or tribe) to be connected to one another. Table 4
shows Newman’s assortative coefficient for the social networks
of each village in our sample. In all villages, except village 6,
the coefficient is positive indicating a tendency of households
of the same caste (or ethnicity) to be more likely to socially
connect to one another. We also find a negative correlation
between village-level social stratification and income diversifi-
cation (correlation coefficient of 0.32). This result suggests
that social stratification can deter diversification. Unfortu-
nately the small number of villages in this study prevents a
deeper village-level analysis of homophilia.
Table 5 presents summary statistics for the two network cen-
trality measures. Mean degree centrality is 0.25 indicating
that, on average, households in our sample have network links
with 25% of the other households in their respective villages. 5
Eigenvector centrality is a measure that accounts for the net-
work importance of one’s network links. Figure 1 is a scatter
plot of degree and eigenvector centrality measures calculated
for the households in our sample. Although the two measures
are positively correlated, the plot shows that some households
have high-degree centrality (i.e. several connections) but low
eigenvector centrality (i.e. these connections are not to central
nodes).
(c) Demographics, Assets, and shocks
Table 6 presents summary statistics for the socioeconomic
characteristics of households included in our survey. These
are determinants of income diversification that have been pre-
viously explored in the literature (e.g., Belcher et al., 2015;
Ellis, 1998; Martin & Lorenzen, 2016). The average household
has 3.1 adult members. 81% of households are headed by
males and 40% are scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. The
average age of household heads is 53 years and average educa-
tion is between the primary and upper primary levels.
Eighty-six percent of the sample households use electricity
while 70% use gas. On average, these households own 0.17
goats and 1.67 hoes. Average area of owned land is approxi-rning sources in Meenangadi, Wayanad
Income (in Rupees) Income shares
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
18,721.2 47,156.0 0.109 0.212
81.9 751.6 0.001 0.007
311.0 1,051.4 0.003 0.019
1,452.3 8,169.7 0.009 0.044
10,480.9 45,791.2 0.053 0.149
33.3 407.6 0.000 0.003
6,134.2 19,972.3 0.047 0.153
71,841.8 75,215.9 0.530 0.404
12,389.4 40,947.9 0.070 0.209
31,063.4 86,872.4 0.139 0.294
3,885.9 14,807.8 0.039 0.130
56,511.7 119,914.4 1 —
urvey. See Ragu et al. (2013). Exchange Rate: 1 USD = Rs. 59. Note: For





i¼1 P i;s  Avg ShareðsÞ
 2q
. The average share across sources can be
6,511.7.
Table 2. Income differences by households who have diversified vs non-diversified in Meenangadi, Wayanad
Diversified Non-diversified
Average income (Rs.) 162,303.2 127,554.2
Standard deviation (Rs.) 8,059.5 9,161.2
Number of households 250 50
Ho: Mean (non-diversified) = Mean (Diversified)
Ha: Mean (non-diversified) < Mean (Diversified)
P-value = 0.031
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the APMMonitoring and Evaluation Survey, 2013. See Ragu et al. (2013) and survey conducted by the authors for
this paper. Exchange rate: 1 USD = Rs. 59.
Table 3. Summary statistics – Simpson index
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Simpson 300 0.274 0.224 0.000 0.719
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the APM Monitoring and Evaluation Survey, 2013. See Ragu et al. (2013).
Table 4. Assortativity and Simpson indices










Source: Authors’ analysis of data collected by authors.
*denotes village average.
Table 5. Summary statistics – network centrality
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Degree Centrality 300 0.246 0.158 0.028 0.947
Eigenvector Centrality 300 0.436 0.253 0.003 1.000
Source: Authors’ analysis of data collected by authors.
382 WORLD DEVELOPMENTmately one acre. Ten percent of the households experienced a
crop failure within the 12-month period preceding the inter-
view and 1% experienced a loss of assets in that same time per-
iod.
(d) Estimates of the empirical models
Table 7 reports parameter estimates for model (1). Statisti-
cal inference is based on bootstrapped standard errors because
the dependent variable is an index. In addition, we cluster the
standard errors to allow for correlations within village, which
is relevant for our village-level network model. The table
reports parameter estimates based on the GMM/IV strategy
which are consistent under the assumption of strict exogeneity
of X (see Section 3(e) and (i)).
We estimate a statistically significant average network effect
of 0.721. That is, a 1% increase in the diversification of a
household’s social network increases its own diversification
by 0.721%. This result suggests a social multiplier of 3.6. In
other words, the social network amplifies the effect of otherdeterminants of livelihood diversification (such as education)
by 3.6 times. 6
We find statistical evidence that two demographic character-
istics influence income diversification among our sample.
First, higher levels of education are associated with higher
income diversification. Specifically, a one-step increase in edu-
cation leads to a direct increase of 1.2% in the Simpson index.
However, this effect is amplified by social network feedback
loops (i.e., household i affects j that affects i and so on. . .).
With the social multiplier of 3.6, the total effect of a one-
step increase in education is a 4.3% increase in the Simpson
index. Second, the number of adults in the household is also
positively associated with diversification. An additional adult
in the household leads to a direct increase of 3% in the house-
hold’s Simpson index, and almost 11% when the network mul-
tiplier is considered.
Although our GMM/IV estimates of the effect of assets on
diversification are generally positive and consistent with the
previous diversification literature (e.g., Anderson &
Deshingkar, 2005; Martin & Lorenzen, 2016), these coeffi-
Figure 1. Scatter plot of centrality measures. Source: Authors’ analysis of data collected by authors.
CHARACTERIZING SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON INCOME DIVERSIFICATION IN RURAL KERALA 383cients are imprecisely estimated and not statistically signifi-
cant. We also investigate how households respond to negative
shocks. We find that households that suffered a recent crop
failure are more diversified. Specifically, having a recent crop
failure increases the Simpson index by 12%.
Next we discuss results for the network centrality model.
With this model we investigate how social networks affect
income diversification by estimating the impact of network
centrality on the Simpson index. Contrary to the network
model, the centrality model is not affected by the reflection
problem discussed by Manski (1993, 2000). These models are
thus estimated using OLS.
Next, we discuss two alternative approaches to estimate the
average network effect model that serve as robustness checks
for our finding that social networks influence income diversifi-
cation. First, note that Table 2 shows that the Simpson index
has a probability mass at 0 and this can be thought of as a cor-
ner solution outcome (i.e., some household do not diversify).
As Wooldridge (2002, Ch. 16) explains, these corner solution
models can be estimated using a censored regression model,
or Tobit model. In our case, given the endogeneity of network
diversification, we use a maximum likelihood approach to esti-
mate a Tobit model with endogenous explanatory variables
(Wooldridge 2002, p. 530). The results corroborate the exis-
tence of strong network effects on income diversification.
The Tobit estimate of the average network effect is 0.882
(p < 0.01). 7 Its 95% confidence interval [0.45,1.31] overlaps
with that of the GMM/IV estimate [0.39,1.05], which indicates
that these two parameters are not statistically different. Note,
however, that consistency of the Tobit estimate depends on
homoscedasticity and normality assumptions, which are not
needed in the linear GMM/IV approach. In addition, as we
cluster standard errors at the village level, statistical inference
of the GMM/IV estimate is based on a heteroscedasticity–auto
correlation consistent (HAC) variance estimator.Our second analysis checks the robustness of the social
network effect to the measurement of income diversification.
The Simpson index takes into consideration all 11 possible
sources of income described in Table 1 and, as such, is able
to capture fine differences in diversification strategies. For
example, two households that fully rely on agricultural
activities and have similar total income can have different
Simpson measures if one focuses on 3 agricultural activities
(e.g., sales of stable crops, by-products, and vegetables), and
the other focuses 2 activities (e.g., livestock sales and ser-
vices). A simpler way to measure income diversification is
to compute the share of income that comes from non-
agricultural activities. We estimate Eqn. (2)—the average
network effect model—by replacing the Simpson index with
the share of non-farm income of each household. Results
again indicate statistically significant network effects. Specif-
ically, we estimate an average network effect of 0.425
(p < 0.05), i.e., a 1% increase in the share of nonfarm
income of a household’s social network increases its own
nonfarm share by 0.425%. 8
Table 8 reports regression estimates for two representations
of network centrality, one in which centrality is measured by
the degree index and another where centrality is measured
by the eigenvector index. We find that network centrality
has a positive and statistically significant effect on diversifica-
tion. In addition, our estimates suggest that degree centrality
has a stronger influence on income diversification than eigen-
vector centrality. Specifically, a 1% increase in degree central-
ity increases the Simpson index by 0.19%, while the
corresponding increase in eigenvector centrality is 0.12%.
These results suggests that the number of social connections
of a household has an effect on diversification and that having
more connections may be more important than having con-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7. Estimates of the average network effect model
Dependent variable: Simpson GMM/IV estimates

































Prob > chi2 0.000
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the village level in
parentheses (1000 replications).
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the APM Monitoring and Eval-
uation Survey, 2013. See Ragu et al. (2013) and survey conducted by the
authors for this paper.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
384 WORLD DEVELOPMENTEstimates of the marginal effects of demographics, assets,
and income shocks on diversification are robust across the
two models and are also similar to the estimates from the net-
work effect model. This suggests that the network effect (1)
and network centrality (3) models represent different but con-
sistent approaches to investigate the influence of social net-
works on diversification. There are, however, a few
differences between the models. In particular, the centrality
model results show a statistically significant effect of three
variables that were not significant in the GMM/IV estimate
of model (1): social category, goats, and hoes. This result is,
in part, a result of the efficiency loss associated with the instru-
mental variable approach.5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In developing countries, it is rare for households to special-
ize in a single income-earning activity (Reardon, 1997).
Table 8. Estimates of the network centrality model













Number of adults 0.032** 0.030**
(0.015) (0.013)














Crop failure 0.112** 0.116**
(0.043) (0.045)





Wald chi2(13) 131.73 129.77
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the village level in
parentheses (1000 replications).
Source: Authors’ analysis of data from the APM Monitoring and Eval-
uation Survey, 2013. See Ragu et al. (2013) and survey conducted by the
authors for this paper.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
CHARACTERIZING SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON INCOME DIVERSIFICATION IN RURAL KERALA 385Results in this paper support the importance of income diver-
sification in this poor and socially diverse region of rural Ker-
ala, India. Only 20% of households specialize in a single
income-generation activity, the remaining 80% earn income
from two or more agricultural or non-agricultural activities.
The average Simpson index for the 301 households is 0.274.
Using similar income categories and survey methods,
Khatun and Roy (2012) found average Simpson indices of
0.206 and 0.562 in two districts of West Bengal, while Saha
and Bahal (2014) found an average Simpson index of 0.46 in
two other districts of West Bengal. In a study of Western
Ghana, Agyeman et al. (2014) found an average Simpson
Index of 0.338, and in another study of four Chinese pro-
vinces, Wei, Chao, and Yali (2016) found Simpson Indices
ranging from 0.50 to 0.68. Overall, this suggests a low-to-
moderate level of diversification in Wayanad district com-
pared to other developing regions.
The link between social networks and diversification is a rel-
atively unexplored area of research. The main focus of this
study was to examine whether social network effects play animportant role on income diversification among rural house-
holds in Wayanad. We represent villages as networks of
households connected through social linkages. In order to
examine the effects of social networks, we use a network
econometric model, based on the Spatial Autoregressive
approach, by replacing the spatial matrix with a network
matrix. We also compute network centrality measures to
examine whether social position is associated with income
diversification. Finally, we measure social stratification using
Newman’s assortative coefficient and correlate this index with
the diversification index.
Average diversification of a household’s social network has a
positive effect on its diversification. This suggests the impor-
tance of ripple effects created through the network interactions.
Given the relevance of diversification among rural households,
it is important to recognize that social network effects can be
critical in promoting diversification activities. We estimate a
network multiplier for income diversification of 3.6. 9
Our multiplier estimate indicates that social networks are an
important component of income diversification. This finding
adds to previous evidence about the importance of social net-
works in India. Munshi and Rosenweig (2016) find that gifts
and loans flowing through connections between caste mem-
bers work as substitutes for formal insurance and state-
sponsored safety nets. They argue that intra-caste connections
are strong and constrain rural–urban migration.
We also use our multiple social dimensions data to measure
households’ social positions in the village network, i.e. degree
and eigenvector centralities. Regression analyses indicate that
households with central positions in their village social net-
work have higher income diversification. This finding corrob-
orates previous results in the literature suggesting that
unfavorable social position can be an important constraint
to economic development. Examples include the influence of
informal social support networks on economic vulnerabilities
in Georgia (Dershem & Gzirishvili, 1998), and the effect of
social capital on household expenditure in South Africa
(Maluccio, Haddad, & May, 2000). In rural India, Rao
(2001) finds that households that actively participate in festi-
vals have higher social status and receive more invitations to
meals from other families. Also in rural India, Banerjee
et al. (2013) explore a natural experiment when a microfinance
institution invited ‘‘leaders” of villages in rural India to an
informational meeting and requested them to spread informa-
tion about microfinance programs. The authors find that the
centrality of these first-informed villagers is an important pre-
dictor of microfinance participation.
Diversification appears to be desirable and highly affected by
social networks. What are the implications for program and
policy design? This suggests that households in positions of
prominence or central households may have positive influence
on diversification. Central households tend to have better
access to resources due to their position in the network struc-
ture. On the other hand this information can also be used to
target households (with high centrality) within networks to dis-
seminate important information regarding training opportuni-
ties, government initiatives, and availability of skills & services
that can facilitate and promote diversification in rural areas.
In contrast with studies such as Baird and Gray (2014) that
focus on exchange networks, our interviews capture a range of
social and economic connections between households. The
descriptive results on the structure of the social networks show
that all 9 study villages contain a mixture of castes and/or ethnic
groups.Our data allowus tomeasure social stratification in these
rural villages. We use the assortativity coefficient of Newman
(2003) to capture village-level homophily. In conjunction with
386 WORLD DEVELOPMENTcaste information, this coefficient captures the tendency for
nodes of the same caste (or ethnic group) to be connected to
one another. Therefore, this coefficient can be thought of as a
measure of social stratification. Results indicate that caste-
based homophily is present in 8 out of the 9 villages in our sam-
ple. This result is consistent with the claim of Munshi and
Rosenweig (2016) that strong intra-caste connections constrain
rural–urban migration in India. Finally, we examine the rela-
tionship between the social stratification and income diversifica-
tion indices at the village level. We conclude that social
stratification is negatively correlated with diversification of
income sources. This result suggests that while social networks
may foster positive influences by serving as conduits for eco-
nomic development, the benefits of social interactions could be
even greater if rural villages in India were less socially stratified.
The study found relatively few significant determinants of
diversification. Two of the four significant determinants—edu-
cation, number of adult members—are consistent with the
opportunity-led model of diversification. One of the significant
determinants—crop failure—supports the survival-led model,
while the final significant determinant—social group—could
be consistent with either model. These results are consistent
with other similar studies. Assets appear to be less important
in this study than other similar studies.
Our work has several limitations. First, our sampling strategy
focuses on intermediate-sized villages so that all households in
each village are surveyed. While this is important to avoid pos-
sible measurement error biases associated with sampled net-
works, it raises a question about what information is lost by
cutting off the tails of the village size distribution. While our
sampling design does not offer significant variation to explore
the relationship between centrality and village size, the social
network data of rural villages in India collected by Banerjee
et al. (2013) does. 10 Their study offers the opportunity for this
examination as they sampled 75 Indian villages (not so far from
our study sites) with significant variation in size. Using these
data, we regress average degree (i.e. number of connections)
on village size and find that the slope coefficient is close to zero
and not statistically significant. This result suggests that village
size does not systematically affect centrality. However, further
diversification research using larger sample sizes is needed to
formally test whether or not the effect of network centrality
on income diversification varies with village size.Second, social network analysis requires the specification of
network boundaries. Our network models are based on
within-village social contacts. It is possible, however, for indi-
viduals to engage in between-village interactions that are not
captured in our analysis. Nevertheless, we do not think these
interactions, if they exist, have large impacts. Our rationale
for setting the village as the network boundary of social inter-
action is twofold: (i) it is well-documented in the literature that
the strength of social interactions between individuals
decreases with social, or geographic, distance (Akerlof, 1997;
Bramoulle et al., 2009). This is also known as the distance-
decay effect (Matous, Todo, & Mojo, 2013) and is the founda-
tion of the widespread use of distance decay mechanisms to
model spatial dependence in spatial econometric models
(Anselin, 1986); (ii) each village in our sample represents a dis-
tinct geographical area where clearly identifiable clusters of
households form a village. 11 A possible mechanism for social
interactions between villages in our sites is the existence of
dairy and other agricultural and marketing cooperatives that
historically represent an important component of develop-
ment. However, we have qualitative evidence from focus
groups that these cooperatives are not currently perceived to
be an important tool for aggregation of social capital; hence,
we do not anticipate significant social interaction effects
between households of different villages. 12 Despite the limita-
tion of having to specify a ‘‘finite” social network, the above
arguments make us confident that within-village networks
capture the bulk of social influences in this region of India.
Third, our finding of a negative correlation between social
stratification and the diversification of income sources is based
on a small number of villages. This data restriction prevents us
from using social network analysis to further explore caste-
based stratification. Future research should concentrate on
gathering sufficient village-level information to allow for more
robust statistical analyses.
The social network dataset collected by our research team is
very rich and its potential and applicability goes beyond the
study of income diversification. Other economic dimensions
may be influenced by network interactions and should be the
focus of future research. Subsequent projects may also focus
on the disaggregation of the different dimensions of social con-
tacts to conduct an in-depth analysis of social structure in
rural India.NOTES1. As described by Jackson (2008), eigenvectors are vectors that, when
acted upon by the network matrix, give back some rescaling of themselves.
This is useful to capture the idea that an individual is central when it is
connected to central individuals. This concept has a self-referential
problem: centrality is a function of centrality. The eigenvector of the
network matrix associated with the eigenvalue of 1 captures this concept
and returns centrality without rescaling.
2. The average exchange rate in 2014 was 63.5 rupees for 1 US dollar.
3. Clarification note: for each income source, table 1 reports the average
share across households. For source s, this average is calculated as
Avg ShareðsÞ ¼ 1n
Pn
i¼1P i;s. This procedure allow us to calculate standard
deviations for each share: Std: Dev:ðsÞ ¼ 1n
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiPn
i¼1ðP i;s  Avg ShareðsÞÞ2
q
.
The average share across sources can be obtained by dividing the average
income of source s by the total income of 156,511.7.4. Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm draws undirected graphs according
to five generally accepted aesthetic criteria: i) distribute the vertices evenly
in the frame; ii) minimize edge crossings; iii) make edge lengths uniform;
and iv) reflect inherent symmetry; and v) conform to the frame. Refer to
Fruchterman and Reingold (1991) for details.
5. Average degree centrality is often referred in the network literature as
network density.
6. The social multiplier is approximated by g  1=ð1 b1Þ (see section
3.4.1). We also estimate the average network effect model using a naive
OLS approach to illustrate the importance of controlling for the
endogeneity of the network effects. The OLS estimate of b1 is 0.328,
implying a social multiplier of 1.5, a value much smaller than the 3.6
estimate produced by the consistent GMM/IV model. This highlights the
downward bias of the OLS model and the importance of controlling for
reverse causality in the estimation of the network effect model.
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8. Full regression results are available upon request.
9. We are the first to estimate multipliers for income diversification;
nevertheless, to put this number in perspective, our multiplier is greater
than those estimated by Glaeser et al. (2003) ranging from 1.67 to 2.17 for
wage spillovers in the U.S. They find important social multipliers in
different social contexts. They report social multipliers ranging from 1.4 to
2.2 for group membership among college roommates, and from 1.7 to 8.2
for crime rates.
10. The data is available online at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.
xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/21538.11. In our experience, this contrasts with several study sites in Africa
where the boundary between villages are not clearly geographically
identified and different villages often constitute a continuous housing
landscape.
12. The focus group methodology is described in Breitkreuz et al. (in
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See Figures 2–10.or village 1 in Meenangadi, Wayanad.
Figure 3. Visualization of social network for village 2 in Meenangadi, Wayanad.
Figure 4. Visualization of social network for village 3 in Meenangadi, Wayanad.
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Figure 5. Visualization of social network for village 4 in Meenangadi, Wayanad.
Figure 6. Visualization of social network for village 5 in Meenangadi, Wayanad.
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Figure 7. Visualization of social network for network 6 in Meenangadi, Wayanad.
Figure 8. Visualization of social network for village 7 in Meenangadi, Wayanad.
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Figure 9. Visualization of social network for village 8 in Meenangadi, Wayanad.
Figure 10. Visualization of social network for village 9 in Meenangadi, Wayanad.
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